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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari to review the following issues:
L

Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the scope of the Revised

Limited Liability Company Act in relation to its affirmance of a verdict for repudiation of a
limited liability company agreement.
2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the district court's

adjudication of claims and defenses presented below.
3.

Whether the court of appeals and district court misapprehend the appropriate

roles of judge and jury in adjudicating the claims and defenses presented below.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following standards of review apply to this appeal. Specific standards will be
referenced in the body of the argument where appropriate.
Review of Ruling of Court of Appeals: On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions
of the court of appeals for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State
v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, \ 7, 190 P.3d 1255, 1257.
Review of Jury Verdict: In reviewing a jury verdict, this court views the facts, and
all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to that verdict. Cheves v.
Williams, 993 P.3d 191, 193-194 (Utah 1999).

1

Denial of Motion to Dismiss: This Court reviews the district court's legal ruling
for correctness, and will affirm that ruling only if it is clear the plaintiffs' complaint fails
as a matter of law. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ 8, 66 P.3d 592.
Summary Judgment: Denial of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness with no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Parduhn v. Bennett,
2002 UT 93, K 5, 61 P.3d 982; U.R.C.P. 56.
Directed Verdict: This Court's standard of review of a directed verdict is the same
as that imposed upon a trial court. A trial court is justified in granting a directed verdict
only if, examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving part/, there is
no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor.
Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, t 3, 975 P.2d467.
Jury Instruction: Reversal is called for when the instruction is inaccurate and there
is a reasonable likelihood, not a mere possibility, that the error affected the result. Haupt
v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ^ 38, 131 P.3d 252.
Conduct of Proceedings: A district court's decisions in conducting proceedings
before it are reviewed for abuse of discretion within the confines of the legal standards
set by the appellate courts. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27
(Utah App. 1991).
Abuse of Discretion: A court abuses its discretion when it does not follow the law
and when it exceeds the bounds of discretion afforded by law. State v. Henriod, 2006 UT
11, \ 19, 131 P.3d 232; State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 33, 27 P.3d 1115.

2

Sufficiency of Evidence: Viewing the marshaled evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to a verdict, the evidence must be legally sufficient
to support the verdict. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 475 (Utah App. 1993).
PRESERVATION BELOW
For the first time in this appeal, Burningham asserts the inadequacy of the district
court's jury instructions regarding capital accounts and the district court's failure to
address his equitable defense of laches. He has not preserved these issues and this Court
should not review them.
PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
The following provision of Utah's Revised LLC Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101
to -1902 (2001) is of central importance to the appeal:
48-2c-807. Duties of managers and members.
(1) A member or manager shall not be liable or accountable in damages or otherwise
to the company or the members for any action taken or failure to act on behalf of the
company unless the act or omission constitutes:
(a) gross negligence;
(b) willful misconduct; or
(c) a breach of a higher standard of conduct that would result in greater exposure to
liability for the member or manager that is established in the company's articles of
organization or operating agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Petitioner

Wayne

Burningham

("Burningham")

and

Plaintiff/

Respondent Richard Wilson ("Wilson") were the only two members of OLP, LLC
("OLP"), a company formed to produce anti-reflective lenses. (Ct. App. ^f 1.) The jury
below determined that Burningham repudiated the LLC agreement, converted the assets

3

of the LLC to his own beneficial use and excluded Wilson from OLP. The jury also
found in favor of Wilson on his claims against Bumingham for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty and awarded Wilson compensatory damages.

Bumingham

appealed and the court of appeals upheld the district court's adjudication of this case in
all respects. The issue before this Court is whether under Utah law one LLC member
may bring a civil cause of action for damages against another member.
A.

Relevant Course of Proceedings in the Case, and Disposition Below
1.

District Court Proceedings and Disposition

Wilson brought suit on July 25, 2001, on his own and OLP's behalf against
Bumingham and his solely owned corporation, Optical Lens Products Management, Inc.,
d/b/a Intermountain Antireflective Coatings ("IARC"). Bumingham and Richard Wilson
were the sole members of OLP. Wilson brought the case against Bumingham because
Bumingham—as the jury ultimately found—had repudiated his agreement with Wilson
regarding the operation of the OLP and had converted the assets of OLP to Bumingham's
own benefit and use and to the exclusion of Wilson. (Special Verdict Form, Question 12,
R. 1107). Wilson's Complaint sought damages for Bumingham's breach of contract and
fiduciary duties, repudiation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and causing Wilson's detrimental reliance. (R. 18-22). Plaintiffs also sought
equitable remedies in the form of: 1) declaratory relief to determine the terms of the
management and ownership agreement regarding OLP, and whether Bumingham
breached his contractual and fiduciary duties; and 2) injunctive relief affording Wilson a
proper accounting which Bumingham had previously denied him, and preventing
4

Burningham from converting the assets of OLP to his own use and to the exclusion of
Wilson, and otherwise operating OLP contrary to the parties' agreement. (R. 15-18).
At trial Wilson introduced to the jury substantial and specific evidence of his
damages resulting from Bumingham's repudiation and breaches of contract and fiduciary
duties from early in the management of OLP through the time of trial. Three certified
public accountants and a business valuation consultant testified before the jury. (See,
e.g., R. 2021 at 555; 2022 at 714-15; 2023 at 820-21; 2027 at 1442). The evidence
included discussion and analysis of accounting procedures, specific transactions, the
treatment and content of tax returns for IARC and OLP, tax rates, capital accounts,
allocation schedules, revenues and expenses for IARC and OLP, proper expenses for
IARC and OLP, costs of goods sold, revenue on a per-lens basis, balance sheets, profit
and loss statements, and accounting assumptions. (R. 2021 at 557-628, 644-55, 662-87,
696-706; 2022 at 726-50, 794-95; 2023 at 836-46, 935-43; 2027 at 1446-72, 1478-1502;
Exs. 17, 19-21, 23, 33-34, 37, 43-44, 53-54, 59, 64, 98, 106, 312, 326, 326A, 375, Vols.
I-IV passim.)

Evidence also demonstrated that after the commencement of litigation,

Bumingham's CPA, at the instruction of Bumingham and without seeking any input from
Wilson, prepared amended tax returns and other documents, revising the calculation of
the parties' respective ownership interests in OLP, further demonstrating Bumingham's
prior repudiation of his agreement with, and duties to, Wilson. (R. 2021 at 569-77, 58190, 610, 614; 2023 at 950-56; 2024 at 985; 2028 at 1584.) The evidence covered
activities up through trial to exhibit the continuing accrual of damages to the time of trial.
(R. 2021 at 552-669.)
5

From his initial pleading through post-trial motions Burningham claimed that the
provisions of the Utah Revised LLC Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101 to -1902 ("LLC
Act" or the "Act") provided the sole legal authority for determining the rights,
responsibilities and remedies of Bumingham and Wilson with respect to OLP. (R. 58-60,
63, 117-23, 158-65, 303-05, 323-32, 367-89, 608-27, 524-32, 669-70, 882-87, 899-901,
934-36, 1203-07; 2024 at 978-91; 2026 at 1247-1282). The district court denied
Burningham's pre-trial motions seeking dissolution of OLP and seeking to strike
Wilson's jury demand for his legal damages claims. (R. 408-410, 1022-1023). Wilson
opposed these motions, seeking to have his legal damages claims against Burningham
tried to a jury. In opposing the motions, Wilson relied, in part, on partnership cases in
which similar disputes were tried to a jury. (R. 696-702). Each of Burningham's pretrial motions was ultimately denied by the trial court. (R. 409, 1023, 1145, 1978-1981;
2014 at 2-5, 14-15; 2016 at 43; 2017 at 23, 30-37, 43-44; 2024 at 978-90; 2026 at 1278,
1282; 2028 at 1524-29, 1549-57, 1583-87, 1650). Having failed to dissolve OLP prior to
a trial on Wilson's legal claims, Burningham submitted two related motions on the
penultimate day of trial, one seeking to dissolve OLP (R. 2024 at 978-979) and one
seeking to limit Wilson's recovery by cutting off compensatory damages past the date of
dissolution. (R. 2024 at 979-982; 2026 at 1246-1282).
Although the district court recognized the LLC Act's applicability to the case, it
did not judicially dissolve OLP under the LLC Act; rather, it made a preliminary
determination that there were grounds for dissolution sufficient to dissolve OLP as of
August 31, 2001, the date Bumingham filed his Answer and counterclaims seeking
6

dissolution and winding up.

(R. 58-60; 2026 at 1282). The district court did not

judicially dissolve OLP at that time. On this issue, the trial court specifically stated:
For the record, I am determining and I think it's time to do so that a
dissolution occurred—and I already went through the statutory basis and
the facts under 48-2c-1210-2, a dissolution did occur no later than August
31, 2001 and that is the date we'll use. I'm determining that it's a jury
Question whether there was a wrongful dissolution chargeable to Mr.
Burningham and that the elements that have to be set forth and addressed in
the verdict form are exclusion, repudiation and conversion of the assets of
the LLC and the determination of damages will be dictated to a large extent
by what the jury determines. If they determine a wrongful dissolution, they
can address full expectation including lost profit clear through trial If they
do not determine wrongful dissolution, lost profits are cut off as of August
31, 2001 and you need to put that in specifically and we reserye the
remaining issues for the Court thereafter.
(R. 2026 at 1282) (emphasis added). The district court did not thereafter begin the
judicial dissolution procedures in Utah Code § 48-2c-1211(3) or enter a decree of
dissolution pursuant to Utah Code § 48-2c-1213. (See R. 2026 at 1282). The court did
not judicially dissolve OLP at that time because Wilson was entitled to have a jury render
a verdict on his legal claim. Id. This was the exact process suggested by Burningham 's
counsel, by renewed pretrial motions for summary judgment in the form of a motion for
directed verdict. (R. 1203-07; 2024 at 978-81). The district court adopted the process of
disposition suggested by Bumingham's counsel—i.e. to proceed with the determination
of the jury on a theory of wrongful dissolution—and incorporated it into the disposition
of the case below via jury instructions and verdict form. (R. 2026 at 1282).
Thus, the trial court plainly contemplated and informed counsel that the jury could
determine whether Burningham committed wrongful dissolution of OLP by repudiating
the LLC agreement, converting OLP's assets to his own use, and excluding Wilson from
7

the business and that the jury would address full damages for those claims if they so
found. Only if jury found that Burningham did not wrongfully dissolve OLP would the
trial court address the equitable remedies authorized by the Act. Id.
After considering the substantial evidence presented at trial, the jury found that
Wilson proved that Burningham wrongfully dissolved OLP by proving that Burningham
repudiated the LLC agreement, converted OLP's assets, and excluded Wilson. (R. 1107).
The jury also found for Wilson on his claims for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duties and awarded Wilson compensatory damages in the amount of
$1,214,062.50 and a judgment was entered accordingly.

(R. 1105-1107, 1642).

Burningham posted bond in the amount of the judgment plus interest and filed an appeal.
(R. 1671-73, 1846-48, 1968-69, 1983-84, 1999-2000).
2.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition

A unanimous Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court and jury verdict,
and rejected every charge of legal error Burningham used as the basis for his appeal. (Ct.
App. Op.ffif16, 51, Addendum to Petitioner's Opening Brief Ex. A). Before the Court of
Appeals, Burningham again asserted that the provisions of the LLC Act provided the sole
legal authority for determining rights, responsibilities and remedies with respect to OLP.
{Id. THI 14, 16.) Wilson maintained that the district court had properly allowed his
repudiation claim to proceed to the jury, though, as the Court of Appeals noted, both
parties used the term "wrongful dissolution" when addressing the claim, for the reasons
explained above. {Id. \ 9 n.4.) Burningham argued to the Court of Appeals that the
application of the doctrine of "wrongful dissolution," which ironically he introduced at
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trial stating then that it was the established Utah law regarding repudiation, was actually
not the law and that the district court committed error by applying it. Wilson maintained
in the Court of Appeals, as now, that an LLC member may sue for damages when the
only other LLC member repudiated the LLC agreement and converted the LLC's assets
to his exclusive use and benefit. (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 17-18.)
The Court of Appeals held that under Utah law, "[b]ecause the jury found that
Burningham repudiated his agreement with Wilson, excluded Wilson from OLP, and
converted OLP's assets to his own benefit, a determination of legal damages was
appropriate without the accounting and other remedies that would ordinarily be available
under the LLC Act." (Ct. App. Op. If 51.) The Court of Appeals found that this was so
because "Wanlass describes a cause of action available to LLC members despite the
enactment of the LLC Act."

(Id. If 16.)

The Court of Appeals also found that

Burningham was not deprived of his equitable claims, because a "repudiation claim is an
exception to the general rule that dissolution and accounting must occur prior to an action
between" business partners and, in any case, the jury had already performed that analysis
based on the substantial evidence presented by the parties. (Id. Tflf 33-34.)
B,

Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented on Appeal

In 1998, Wilson and Burningham formed OLP with the intent that each would
own a 50% interest in the company. (R. 2018 at 235-39; Exs. 68 & 69; 2021 at 491).
The business of OLP was the same as, and was to coexist with, Burningham's existing,
solely owned company IARC. (R. 2018 at 235-39; 2021 at 491). With Wilson as a
guarantor, OLP obtained a loan to purchase a machine capable of applying anti-reflective
9

coatings on optical lenses (the "Satis 2"). (R. 6, 43; Exs. 510, 670). The Satis 2 was
installed and operated by OLP at IARC's facilities. (R. 7, 43; Ex. 69). Wilson and
Burningham agreed that all future growth of the anti-reflective lens coating business
beyond that presently at IARC, from whatever source, would belong to OLP. (R. 2019 at
271-74). The relationship with IARC was secured by Burningham's fiduciary obligations
to OLP. (R. 2019 at 277-78; Ex. 69). The parties agreed that IARC would provide the
man-power, facilities, and supplies to run the machine and would invoice clients and
collect payments for amounts owed to OLP. (R. 2019 at 274-76; Ex. 69). Burningham
had his Chief Financial Officer keep the books of OLP as well as IARC's books. (R.
2019 at 278-81). IARC was to invoice OLP for OLP's share of expenses and to remit to
OLP revenues due OLP pursuant to the parties' agreement. (R. 2019 at 277-78; Ex. 69).
Wilson and Burningham each were expected to make an initial capital contribution
of $5,000. (R. 2019 at 285). Wilson made his initial capital contribution as well as
subsequent capital contributions. (R. 2019 at 285-93; Exs. 209-214). Burningham failed
to make any direct capital contributions. (R. 2021 at 500). At trial, the jury heard
evidence that IARC had transferred money to OLP in the form of checks, each of which
indicated that the transfer was a "loan" or an "advance" to OLP, and Burningham
claimed that these transfers were, in fact, capital contributions to OLP made on his
behalf. (R. 2021 at 500-506, 611-613; 2023 at 954-956; 2028 at 1620-1621; Ex. 64).
These monies were, in fact, revenues attributable to OLP and not loans or
advances. (R. 2023 at 611-613; 2028 at 1602). The jury also heard exhaustive testimony
regarding the calculation of OLP's capital accounts. (R. 2021 at 555-665). The jury was
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given an instruction during the trial regarding capital contributions and, after hearing all
evidence, was instructed regarding capital contributions. (R. 1157; 2024 at 1132-1133).
Because IARC had only a single anti-reflective coating machine (the "Satis 1"),
OLP's purchase of the Satis 2 more than doubled the output potential of anti-reflective
lens coating business that could be performed at IARC's facility and dramatically
increased the ability to service customers at the IARC facility. (R. 2018 at 237-41; 2019
at 267). In particular, the Satis 2 significantly increased the product turn around time at
the IARC facility and allowed coating to take place when a machine was down for repair.
(R. 2019 at 271, 308). Because of the dramatically increased capacity, efficiency and
dependability created by OLP and the Satis 2, Wilson and Burningham began marketing
for new customers and also approached IARC's existing customers seeking significant
additional business. (R. 2019 at 269-274). Over time OLP obtained new customers and
also convinced existing IARC customers to significantly increase their anti-reflective
coating business performed at IARC's facility. (R. 2019 at 302-310).
For nearly two years after OLP's inception, Wilson made inquiries of Burningham
and his subordinates regarding the profitability of OLP. (R. 2019 at 278-79, 294, 31125). Burningham, despite the fact that no accounting had been performed for OLP
revenues and expenses, repeatedly rebuffed Wilson and falsely replied that the Satis 2
machine had not yet become profitable. (R. 2019 at 318). In late 2000 and early 2001,
Wilson began to press the issue with Burningham and requested accounting information.
(R. 2019 at 320). Wilson, who was working for IARC at the facility, knew that the Satis
2 machine was operating at or near its full capacity and had to be generating significant
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profits. (R. 2019 at 317). Eventually, Wilson discovered that Burningham and IARC had
utterly failed to keep separate from and had in fact commingled IARC's finances with the
finances of OLP. (R. 2019 at 320-22). In fact, despite running millions of dollars of
business on the Satis 2 machine, IARC failed to attribute any revenue to OLP and instead
IARC retained all of the profits for the benefit of Burningham solely and personally. (R.
2019 at 317, 326-37).
Due to Burningham's multiple breaches of his fiduciary duties to OLP and
Wilson, as well as his unwillingness to pay OLP its share of the revenues of the business,
Wilson had no choice but to file a lawsuit.

(R. 2019 at 336-37).

Burningham's

immediate reaction was to fire Wilson from IARC and effectively bar him from access to
the Satis 2 machine and the premises, thereby assuring Burningham full control of the
Satis 2 machine and its profits. (Exs. 72-74).
After Wilson was fired and up to the time of the lawsuit, Burningham had full
control over the business of the LLC, ran the Satis 2 machine at or near full capacity for
significant periods of time, and kept all of the profits of OLP. (See id; see also, e.g.,
2021 at 552-669). Until the judgment below, Wilson did not receive a single dollar of
profit from his relationship with OLP.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The ruling of the court of appeals should be affirmed in all respects.
This Court granted Burningham's petition for certiorari to consider three issues.
First, did the court of appeals commit error in construing the scope of the Revised Limited
Liability Company Act in its affirmance of a verdict for repudiation of a limited liability
12

company agreement? Second, did the court of appeals commit error in its review of the
district court's adjudication of claims and defenses presented below? And third, did the
court of appeals and district court misapprehend the appropriate roles of judge and jury in
adjudicating the claims and defenses presented below? For the reasons described below, the
answer to each of these questions is unequivocally: "No." This Court should affirm the
ruling of the court of appeals in all respects and dismiss Mr. Burningham's appeal.
The court of appeals properly construed the scope of the LLC Act when it upheld
the jury's verdict for Wilson on his claim that Burningham repudiated the LLC
agreement. The LLC Act expressly contemplates that one LLC member may bring a
civil suit for damages against another member.

While the LLC Act provides other

remedies for disputes between LLC members, such as dissolution and expulsion of a
member, those remedies do not eliminate common law causes of action such as breach of
fiduciary duty and repudiation of the LLC agreement. As such, Wilson was entitled to
bring his claims against Burningham for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and
repudiation and these causes of action were not foreclosed by the LLC Act's dissolution
provisions.
The court of appeals and district court properly understood the appropriate roles of
judge and jury in adjudicating the claims and defenses presented below. The Utah
Constitution guarantees that a litigant bringing legal claims has the right to have those
claims heard by a jury before equitable claims based on the same operative facts are
heard by the district court. The jury's verdict on those legal claims binds the district
court in its adjudication of the parallel equitable proceedings. The district court properly
13

rejected Bumingham's pre-trial motions to enter a decree of judicial dissolution, strike
Wilson's jury demand, and enter into equitable winding up and accounting procedures.
Wilson was entitled to a jury trial on his common law causes of action. The jury's
verdict in Wilson's favor, and Wilson's election to recover compensatory damages for
the loss of his interest in OLP, bound the trial court with respect to an accounting because
the jury had already determined the parties' respective interests in OLP. The jury's
determination that Bumingham repudiated the LLC agreement also foreclosed post-trial
equitable winding up and accounting proceedings because Bumingham's repudiation
eliminated his ability to enforce the provisions of the LLC agreement.
The court of appeals properly reviewed the district court's adjudication of claims and
defenses presented below. The court of appeals properly upheld the jury's verdict that
Bumingham repudiated the LLC agreement. Bumingham's argument to the contrary is
based on a legal standard that does not apply to LLC member damages suits and, in any
event, is a misinterpretation of the law. The jury was properly instructed on repudiation and
the evidence supports the jury's verdict.
The court of appeals properly determined that an accounting and determination of
capital accounts was unnecessary.

Bumingham's repudiation of the LLC agreement,

conversion of OLP's assets and exclusion of Wilson foreclosed equitable accounting
procedures because Bumingham has no legal ability to enforce the provisions of the LLC
agreement. Moreover, the jury's damages calculation binds the district court with respect to
its determination of the parties' ownership interests in OLP. Bumingham has not preserved
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his complaint that the jury was improperly instructed with respect to capital contributions
and capital accounts.
The court of appeals properly found that the district court did not dissolve OLP prior
to trial and was not required to resolve equitable issues prior to trial. Wilson's constitutional
right to a jury trial on his legal claims barred the district court from entering into equitable
proceedings prior to trial. In any event the district court did not, and was not required to,
file a decree of judicial dissolution or otherwise follow the procedures for judicial
dissolution and simply did not dissolve OLP, contrary to Burningham's insistence
otherwise.
Finally, the court of appeals properly upheld the district court's ruling that the jury
considered and rejected Burningham's equitable defenses or otherwise foreclosed
proceedings thereon, In any event, Burningham has failed to preserve his argument with
respect to some of his equitable defenses and his theories on these defenses cannot provide
him any relief and any purported error by the district court was harmless.
For each of these reasons, the opinion of the court of appeals should be affirmed in
all respects and Burningham's appeal should be dismissed in all respects.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE SCOPE OF
THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
JURY VERDICT FOR REPUDIATION OF THE LLC AGREEMENT.
The court of appeals properly determined that the Utah Revised Limited Liability

Company Act permits one member of a limited liability company to seek damages from
another member for repudiation of the LLC agreement. The Act states that "[a] member .
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. . shall not be liable or accountable in damages or otherwise to the company or the
members for any action taken or failure to act on behalf of the company unless the act or
omission constitutes: (a) gross negligence; [or] (b) willful misconduct....

Utah Code §

48-2c-807(l) (emphasis added). That Section clearly indicates that the Utah Legislature
intended that one LLC member may bring a common law cause of action seeking
damages against another member as long as the defendant member's actions, if taken on
behalf of the company, constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Indeed, the LLC Act does not simply permit civil suits among members, the Act
prohibits the limitation of liability among members, thereby ensuring that members may
bring such suits. See Utah Code § 48-2C-120.1 Moreover, the plain language of Section
48-2c-807(l) makes clear that the Act does not limit the liability of members to one
another for acts or omissions that are not made on behalf of the company. See Todd v.
Sullivan Construction, LLC, 191 P.3d 196, 202 & n.l (Idaho 2008) (finding that LLC
member's actions in diverting business and profits from company constitutes willful
misconduct but questioning whether actions were taken "on behalf of the company" and
whether proof of willful misconduct was necessary).

1

Utah Code § 48-2c-120 states that:
A company's articles of organization or operating agreement may
not.. . (b) reduce the duties of members or managers under Section 48-2c807; [or] (i) eliminate or limit the personal liability of [a manager or
member-manager] for damages for any breach of duty [if a legal judgment
or final adjudication] establishes that the manager's acts or omissions (i)
were in bad faith; (ii) involved gross negligence; (iii) involved willful
misconduct, or (iv) resulted in a financial profit or other advantage to which
the manager was not legally entitled.
(emphasis added).
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Courts in jurisdictions with statutes similar to Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l) have
ruled that the plain language of those statutes permits one LLC member to bring a civil
suit for damages against another member.

The Arkansas Supreme Court, in K.C

Properties ofN.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC, —S.W.3d--, 373
Ark. 14 (Ark. 2008), ruled that an Arkansas statute nearly identical to Utah Code § 48-2c807(1) "clearly allows members to be held liable to other members of the limited-liability
company when an act or omission constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct." In
Pur cell v. Southern Hills Investments, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991, 996-1002 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996), the Indiana Court of Appeals found that an Indiana statute nearly identical to Utah
Code § 48-2c-807(l) permits one LLC member to sue another member for breach of
common law fiduciary duties and upheld the trial court's verdict for the victim member.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Idaho Code § 53-622(1), which is
nearly identical to Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l), permits a limited liability company to bring
a suit for damages against one of its members for his acts of soliciting business away
from the company or otherwise usurping the opportunities of the company for his own
personal benefit. See Todd, 191 P.3d at 202-204. The Todd court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs "willful misconduct" claim, which was based on a
common law breach of fiduciary duty theory, remanded to permit the plaintiffs claim to
proceed to trial, and allowed the LLC to seek lost profits from the member. Id. at 199203. The Todd court focused on the LLC's allegation that the member "breached his
fiduciary duty" to the company and noted that the "issue is whether there was sufficient
evidence showing that his conduct in doing so amounted to willful misconduct." Id.
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Burningham argues, in Sections LB of his Opening Brief, that the Act's provisions
regarding dissolution and winding up provide the sole remedy for Wilson's claims. This
argument wholly ignores the Utah Legislature's expressed intent, as set forth in Utah
Code § 48-2c-807(l), to allow LLC members to bring civil suits for damages against
other members. While the Act creates other remedies for member misconduct, such as
dissolution2 or expulsion of the offending member,3 the choice of remedy belongs to the
victim, not the wrongdoer. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) ("The
choice of remedy belongs to the victim of the fraud, and a choice cannot be forced upon
him."); see also Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) ("It
does not lie in the mouth of the wrongdoer to demand that his victim be limited to that
cause of action which is most beneficial to the wrongdoer.").
Wilson was entitled to his choice of remedies in this case. Courts, including the
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, have determined that a
breach of a partnership agreement gives rise to legal, as well as equitable remedies:
Neither is the remedy for breach of a partnership agreement
exclusive. There may be at law a recovery of all the damages which result,
including damages for profits prevented by a wrongful dissolution. Thus, if
one member assumes to dissolve a partnership before the end of the term,
the other may bring an action for damages for the breach and recover not
only his interest, but also his share of the profits which might have been
made during the term. He need not wait until the expiration of the period,
and need not go into equity for an accounting, but may at law show the
probable profits which he has been deprived of

2
3

See Utah Code § 48-2c-1201
&>eUtahCode§48-2c-710
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Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1913) (emphasis added).
Similarly, state courts, including the Utah Court of Appeals, have found that
"[w]here a partner wrongfully repudiates the partnership and converts the assets of
the partnership to his own use and benefit, the excluded partner has a choice of
alternative remedies:
[H]e may waive the tort or breach and sue specifically to enforce the
partnership or joint venture agreement, including the remedy of a judicial
dissolution and an accounting [provided by statute] . . . or the victim may
submit to the repudiation and sue for damages for breach of the joint
venture agreement (including 'profits which might have been made') the
same as any other action for damages for breach of any other contract.
Jeaness v. Besinilian, 706 P.2d 143, 145-146 (Nev. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting
Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343). In Wanlass v. D. Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), the court of appeals adopted this principle for partnership cases. This choice
of remedies in partnership cases described in Jeaness, Gherman, and Wanlass is also
available to LLC members in suits against other members. See K.C. Properties o/N. W,
Arkansas, Inc., -S.W.3d», 373 Ark. 14; Todd, 191 P.3d 196; Purcell, 847 N.E.2d 991.
Confronted with this choice, Wilson chose not to enforce the LLC agreement and,
instead, submitted to Burningham's repudiation and sued for damages for breach of the
LLC agreement.
Wilson's election of remedies foreclosed the equitable procedures set forth in the
Act, such as winding up and an accounting, which presuppose the enforceability of the
LLC agreement. The Act does not limit the damages available to a LLC member when
pursuing civil damages claims against another member and Wilson was properly
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permitted to recover lost profits damages on his repudiation claim. See Todd, 191 P.3d at
199-203 (permitting LLC to recover lost profits damages based on member misconduct).
Utah's LLC Act similarly does not limit the causes of action one member may
bring in order to recover against another member. Utah law is clear that common law
actions continue to operate unless the legislature by statute clearly evidences an intention
to preempt the common law. See generally Utah Code § 68-3-1 (adoption of common
law); Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989 (stating that common law causes of
action are preempted only if legislature does so unequivocally). The LLC Act does not
unequivocally preempt common law causes of action, which are expressly contemplated
by Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l). In Todd, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that Idaho Code
§ 53-622(1) "does not create a cause of action. It sets forth the burden of proof required
for a limited liability company or its member(s) to hold another member or manager
liable for his or her acts or omissions on behalf of the company."4 Id. at 202. The Todd
court did not find that it must create a new cause of action for "LLC breach of fiduciary
duty", as Burningham here suggests is necessary,5 in order for a limited liability company
or one of its members to recover in an action against another member. Id. Rather, the
Todd court recognized that a LLC or one of its members may rely on existing common
4

The Todd court also questioned whether the defendant's conduct, which was "intended
to harm a limited liability company by diverting business and profits from it" is conduct
"taken on behalf of that company," thus questioning whether the burden of proof set forth
in the statute even applied to the case. The court noted that issue of the statute's
application to the case was not before it because the parties had not raised the matter.
Todd, 191P.3dat202&n.l.
5
Burningham contends, in Section II. A of his Opening Brief, that the court of appeals
was required to adopt a "newly minted common law 'LLC repudiation claim'" in order to
affirm the jury's verdict. (Petitioner's Brief at 31).
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law causes of action to recover damages from a member if the member's actions, if taken
on behalf of the LLC, amount to willful misconduct. Id.
Utah's LLC Act requires nothing more than a showing of willful misconduct if the
acts or omissions of the defendant member are made on behalf of the LLC. See Utah
Code § 48-2c-807(l); Purcell, 847 N.E.2d at 1002 (finding that one LLC member may
sue another member for damages based on common law or statutory causes of action).
Of course, if the acts or omissions of the defendant member are not made on behalf of the
company, the plaintiff member need not prove gross negligence or willful misconduct to
recover.
In upholding the jury's verdict of repudiation, the court of appeals properly
construed the scope of the Act. Its Opinion states that "[a]bsent a direct conflict with the
provisions of the LLC Act, we see no reason why an LLC member or members should
not be able to sue for damages when the other member or members wrongfully repudiate
the LLC agreement and convert the LLC's assets to their own use." (Ct. App. Op. at 7, ^
16). The court of appeals properly rejected Burningham's claim that a conflict with the
Act exists. The court rejected Burningham's argument, repeated before this Court, that
the "district court's dissolution of OLP defeats Wilson's repudiation claim as a matter of
law."6 {Id. at 9, ^f 22). The court disagreed with Burningham "because, in the LLC
context, Wilson's claim for repudiation is not a claim seeking dissolution but rather one
6

The court of appeals also questioned Burningham's argument, repeated before this
Court, that the district court judicially dissolved OLP. As set forth in Section III.C, infra,
OLP was not judicially dissolved because the district court did not follow the necessary
procedures for judicial dissolution. See Utah Code § 48-2c-1201(6).
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for damages arising from Bumingham's exclusion of Wilson from OLP and conversion
of OLP's assets to his own use." Id. Wilson's claims were properly addressed separately
and apart from Bumingham's claim for dissolution and the equitable procedures that
attach to such a claim.
Bumingham argues, in Section II.B of his Brief that the Act gives a limited
liability company member the right to avoid a civil damages claim brought by another
member if the wrongdoer brings a claim for dissolution, as Bumingham has done here.
{See Opening Brief of Petitioner at 33-38). Bumingham's position on this point is
summed up in his statement that the district court "let the jury's verdict supplant a proper
LLC analysis". {Id. at 34). This argument is based on the erroneous assumption that,
because the Act sets forth the procedures for dissolution but not for civil suits, a "proper
LLC analysis" is one that resolves LLC disputes by ignoring civil damages suits in favor
of dissolution claims.

Limited liability companies are created by statute and, by

necessity, must be dissolved by statute, which is why the Act sets forth the procedures for
dissolution.

Because the procedures for civil suits were well established when the

Legislature drafted the Act, it was not required that the Act set out those procedures. The
Act does not eliminate civil damages suits simply by relying on and adopting the rules
and procedures for those suits adopted and interpreted by this Court.
Through this appeal, Bumingham attempts to force a member who has been
damaged, such as Wilson has, to accept the remedy chosen by the member who caused
that damage. The plain language of Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l) permits Wilson's suit
against Bumingham for repudiation of the LLC agreement.
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The Act's provisions

regarding dissolution of the company and expulsion of a member also provide a remedy
for member misconduct, but those provisions stand independently from, and cannot be
interpreted in a way that voids, the Legislature's express intention to allow one LLC
member to bring a common law cause of action against another.
Burningham's proposed construction of the Act would condone bad faith behavior
by permitting one LLC member to do to another member just what Burningham did here,
repudiate the LLC agreement between the members, convert the profitable assets of the
LLC to his own use to the exclusion of the other member just as the LLC begins to
become profitable, and then, through legal maneuvering, limit the aggrieved member's
damages to the liquidation value of the depleted LLC—allowing the profitable assets to
pass to the member who converted them. Such an interpretation of the Act would place
every member of every Utah LLC in a competition for LLC assets and resources with
every one of his fellow members, with the prize going to the member who can convert
the most and exclude the fastest. The Legislature did not intend such a result and this
Court should reject such an interpretation of the Act. The Court of appeals properly
construed the scope of the Act when it affirmed the jury's verdict that Burningham
repudiated the LLC agreement and that Wilson was entitled to compensatory damages.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
UNDERSTOOD THE APPROPRIATE ROLES OF JUDGE AND JURY IN
ADJUDICATING THE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES PRESENTED BELOW.
The district court and court of appeals correctly found that Wilson's legal claims

were properly tried to the jury and that the jury's verdict obviated the need for post-trial
equitable proceedings. As set forth in Section I, supra, the LLC Act permits LLC member
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civil suits for damages against other LLC members. As a result, Wilson's legal claims
against Burningham were properly tried to a jury. As set forth below, the district court was
bound by the jury's verdict and post-trial equitable proceedings were unnecessary.
There can be no question that the district court and court of appeals properly
understood the jury's role in adjudicating Wilson's legal claims. In Int'l Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), this Court found
that that article I, section 10 of Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil
cases when equitable issues are also involved. Id. at 420-421 & n.2. "[W]hen legal and
equitable issues turn on the same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first. . .
." Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah
1990). For purposes of determining equitable issues, "the jury's factual determination binds
the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue." Id.
This Court's prior rulings demonstrate that Wilson had a right to a jury trial on his
legal claims before Bumingham's equitable claims could be presented to the district court.
The district court properly rejected Burningham's pre-trial motions to strike Wilson's jury
demand and proceed on Burningham's equitable claims. As set forth in Section III.C, infra,
the requirement that a jury must decide legal claims before equitable claims can be heard
renders meritless Burningham's argument that the district court dissolved OLP prior to trial
and committed error by permitting Wilson's legal claims to proceed to a jury. The district
court, therefore, properly allowed the jury to decide Wilson's legal claims against
Burningham, including his claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
wrongful dissolution, which required proof of repudiation of the LLC agreement,
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conversion of LLC assets and exclusion of Wilson. (Special Verdict Form, R. 1104-1108).
When the jury found for Wilson on his claims, the jury was properly permitted to determine
the amount of compensatory damages to which Wilson was entitled. (R. 1107).
Burningham's claim that the jury's verdict does not foreclose equitable winding up
and accounting procedures is erroneous for several reasons. First, as set forth in Section I,
supra, Wilson's election of remedies foreclosed post-trial equitable wind up and accounting
proceedings. Second, as set forth in Section III.A, Burningham's repudiation of the LLC
agreement bars him from enforcing the provisions of that agreement, such as the equitable
winding up and accounting procedures set forth in the LLC Act. Third, as set forth in
Section III.B, by repudiating the LLC agreement, converting OLP's assets and excluding
Wilson, Bumingham became the sole member of OLP's assets and, as such, no judicial
accounting or wind up is necessary. Finally, as set forth below, any equitable winding up
and accounting procedures would turn on the same operative facts necessary for the jury to
calculate Wilson's compensatory damages and, therefore, the district court is bound by that
calculation.

See Rocky Mountain Irrigation, 795 P.2d at 662 ("[T]he jury's factual

determination binds the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue.").
Bumingham erroneously argues that the jury's calculation of Wilson's compensatory
damages did not address the parties' respective ownership interests in OLP. For the jury to
determine Wilson's compensatory damages resulting from Burningham's repudiation of the
LLC agreement, conversion of LLC assets, and exclusion of Wilson, the jury necessarily
had to determine the parties' relative ownership interests in OLP. The district court
expressly informed the parties prior to closing arguments that the jury would determine the
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facts with respect to evidence of purported capital contributions to OLP.7 (R. 2026 at 13301331). The jury was also asked to determine whether the parties initially agreed to an
equal ownership interest in OLP and found that they did.

(Special Verdict Form

Question No. 1,R. at 1104).
Having determined the parties' initial ownership interests and having considered
whether checks from IARC to OLP were capital contributions on Bumingham's behalf or
were loans to OLP or were actually advances to OLP for profits due to OLP from IARC,
the jury awarded Wilson compensatory damages, which required the jury to determine
the parties' respective ownership interests in OLP. Burningham has not challenged the
trial court's instruction to the jury regarding compensatory damages, which states that
"[compensatory damages are those damages which will compensate plaintiffs for any
injury or loss plaintiffs sustained as a result of defendants' breaches. Such damages may
include expectation damages."

(R. at 1162).

That instruction went on to define

expectation damages as "the damages necessary to place the non-breaching party in as
good a position as if the contract had been fully performed." (Id). To place Wilson in as
good a position as if the LLC agreement had been performed, the jury would have to
determine the parties' respective ownership interests in order to apportion to Wilson his
share of the LLC's profits and value.

7

In a dialoge about the capital contribution jury instruction between the Court and
counsel, (R. 2026 at 1319-1331), the court expressly informed the parties that the jury
would decide whether IARC checks to OLP were loans, or capital contributions and that
Burningham was "free to argue that this really wasn't a loan." (R. 2026 at 1331)
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The jury's determination of Wilson's ownership interest in OLP, and the
liquidated value of that ownership interest in the form of Wilson's compensatory
damages, is necessarily based on the same operative facts that would be put before the
district court in an equitable proceeding to determine of the parties' ownership interests.
As a result, pursuant to Rocky Mountain Irrigation, the district court is bound by the
jury's determination. As a practical matter, everything that was not awarded to Wilson
belongs to Burningham and no separate winding up or accounting is necessary with
respect to Burningham's share of OLP. Moreover, Burningham has failed to marshal
evidence with respect to the facts upon which the jury's verdict, and damages award, was
based and may not now argue that the district court would have been presented a different
set of facts in equitable proceedings.
Burningham argues that the jury was not properly instructed on capital contributions
and capital accounts and, therefore, its damages calculation cannot substitute for a court's
equitable determination. Burningham has not previously argued before the court of appeals
or the trial court that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding capital
contributions and, because he has not preserved that argument for appeal, the argument
should not be heard. Burningham's argument lacks merit in any event because the jury was
given all instructions necessary for it to determine whether checks from IARC to OLP were
capital contributions on Burningham's behalf or were loans to be paid back and, therefore,
not capital contributions. (R. 1101; 2024 at 1132-1133, 1157). Burningham presented no
other evidence of capital contributions to OLP or any other evidence that that could have
increased his share of OLP's ownership. The jury was properly instructed regarding capital
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contributions and simply disagreed with Burningham's version of the facts. The district
court properly determined that it was bound by the jury's determination of damages, which
necessarily included a determination of ownership interests in OLP. The court of appeals
properly reviewed the district court's rulings on this issue and this Court should not disturb
the court of appeals' ruling.
The district court and court of appeals properly understood the appropriate roles of
judge and jury in adjudicating the claims and defenses presented below. Having properly
understood the roles of judge and jury, the court of appeals properly reviewed the district
court's adjudication of the claims and defenses presented below.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REVIEWED THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ADJUDICATION OF THE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
PRESENTED BELOW.
"On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not the

decision of the [district] court. [This Court] must determine whether that court accurately
reviewed the [district] court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v.
Cornell, 2005 UT 28, % 10, 114 P.3d 569, 572 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The court of appeals applies various standards of review to the decisions of the
district court. Appellate courts "review [the] use of equitable remedies under an abuse of
discretion standard." Myrah v. Campbell 2007 UT 168, \ 25, 162 P.2d 679. Regarding
questions of law, the court of appeals reviews the district court's actions for correctness.
Mardanlou v. Ghajfarian, 2006 UT App 165, fflj 8-9, 135 P.3d 904. A district court's
conduct of proceedings is reviewed for basic fairness to determine abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Atty., 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991).
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Burningham does not, by and large, assign error to the jury's verdict on Wilson's
legal claims. He does not assert that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient for
the jury to reach its verdict, either with respect to liability or damages, and does not marshal
evidence necessary to make such an argument. Burningham's challenges to Wilson's legal
claims are limited to his claim that the district court erroneously instructed the jury
regarding repudiation, that the provisions of the LLC Act foreclose Wilson's legal claims
for damages, and that the district court dissolved OLP and Wilson's legal claims could
thereafter not be heard. Burningham also asserts that the district court committed reversible
error by failing to address his equitable defenses. As set forth below, the court of appeals
properly reviewed the district court's adjudication of these claims and defenses.
A.

The Court of Appeals Properly Upheld the Jury's Verdict Finding
Repudiation of the LLC Agreement.

As set forth in Section I, supra, the court of appeals properly ruled that the Act
entitled Wilson to bring a civil suit for damages against Burningham for repudiation of the
LLC agreement. The court of appeals also properly upheld the jury's verdict finding that
Burningham repudiated the LLC agreement. Burningham does not dispute the jury's
findings, does not allege that his actions were made on behalf of OLP but failed to rise to
the level of willful misconduct, see Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l), and does not marshal
evidence in an effort to challenge the sufficiency of the jury's findings.

Rather,

Burningham seeks to be spared from the natural consequences of his willful misconduct,
alleging three errors regarding the court of appeals' review of the jury's verdict.

29

Burningham first argues that the provisions of the LLC Act provide Wilson's only
remedy and foreclosed Wilson's claim for damages. Second, Burningham argues that the
district court judicially dissolved OLP and the jury should not have been presented
evidence on the matter in the first instance. These two arguments are addressed in other
sections of this Brief. As set forth in Section I, supra, the Act specifically contemplates
that members may bring common law causes of action against other members and that
the Act's dissolution provisions do not eliminate civil damages suits between members.
As discussed in Sections II, supra, and III.C, infra, Wilson's legal claims were entitled to
be heard by a jury prior to consideration of Burningham's parallel equitable defenses and
Bumingham's claim that the district court dissolved OLP ignores both the district court's
ruling and the explicit provisions of the LLC Act governing dissolution procedures.
Bumingham's third argument, that the jury was not properly instructed regarding
repudiation, is without merit. In Section II.C of his Opening Brief, Burningham argues
that repudiation requires denial of the existence of the LLC, that Wilson had no evidence
that Burningham had denied the existence of OLP and that, as a result, the district court
should have granted his motion for summary judgment and pre-trial motions to strike
Wilson's jury demand and conduct an accounting of OLP.

As set forth below,

Bumingham's proposed definition of repudiation is based on a misreading of a California
case and on a concept of partnership law that has no application to this case. Adoption of
that definition would require this Court to ignore the will of the Legislature and to import
a new, extra-statutory limitation relating to civil damages suits between LLC members.
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1.

Burningham's proposed definition of "repudiation" has
application to this LLC member civil damages suit.

no

Burningham invites this Court to impose a misinterpretation of a standard
applicable to partnership wrongful dissolution claims to LLC member civil suits. Before
the trial court, Burningham succeeded in requiring Wilson to prove that Burningham
wrongfully dissolved OLP in order for Wilson to recover. (R. 2024 at 979-982; 2026 at
1247-1282). The partnership wrongful dissolution standard has no application to this
case, which is a suit by one LLC member against another for damages. Not only is
Burningham's proposed definition of repudiation legally incorrect in partnership
wrongful dissolution cases, see Section III.A.2, infra, that definition, or any other
limitation on the causes of action available in LLC member civil suits, cannot apply here
because the LLC Act does not recognize or impose such a limitation.
In this suit by one LLC member against another, Burningham seeks protection by
seeking extension of the general rule of partnership law "that there can be but one form of
action between partners—an action for judicial dissolution and accounting . . . ."
Gherman, 140 Cal. Rtpr. at 338. In partnership cases, an exception to that rule exists
such that when the partnership has been dissolved in contravention of the partnership
agreement, the victim partners have "the right as against each partner who has caused
dissolution wrongfully to damages for breach of the agreement." Utah Code § 48-135(2)(a); see also Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 341. This is not a partnership case and
there is no such general rule for limited liability companies. In the LLC context, one
member may bring suit against another member for "any action taken or failure to act on
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behalf of the company" if the act or omission constitutes "gross negligence or willful
misconduct." see Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l). As set forth in Section I, supra, Utah Code
§ 48-2c-807(l) provides the only limitation on civil suits brought by one LLC member
against another. The LLC Act, as opposed to cases interpreting partnership law, provides
the standards applicable in this case. Bumingham's invitation for this Court to adopt
some further, extra-statutory standard imported from partnership wrongful dissolution
cases should be rejected. The full extent of the LLC Act's limitations on damages claims
among LLC members is set forth in Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l). That statute does not
contain a requirement that one member disclaim the existence of the LLC and this Court
should not read such a requirement into the Act. Bumingham's proposed definition of
"repudiation" is inapplicable for purposes of LLC member civil damages suits.
2.

Bumingham's proposed definition of "repudiation" is legally
incorrect in the partnership wrongful dissolution context.

Aside from being irrelevant in the context of LLC member suits, Bumingham's
proposed definition of repudiation is legally incorrect as it applies to partnership
wrongful dissolution, which is the source of law Bumingham cites for his proposed
definition. Bumingham argues that repudiation requires "a denial of the very existence of
a partnership or joint venture relationship in any form or at any time." (Opening Brief of
Petitioner at 39 (citing Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343)).8 Bumingham distinguishes this
type of "repudiation" from common law contract repudiation as it has been defined by
this Court and other sources.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that

8

As set forth in Section II.A.2, infra, Bumingham's definition of "repudiation" is legally
incorrect even in the partnership wrongful dissolution context.
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repudiation is "a voluntary or affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or
apparently unable to perform without [a total] breach."

Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 250(b). A "total breach" is defined as a breach that "so substantially impairs
the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in the
circumstances to allow him to recover damages based on all his remaining rights to
performance." Id. § 243(d). "Generally, a party acts at his peril if, insisting on what he
mistakenly believes to be his rights, he refuses to perform his duty."

Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 250 cmt. d.
Utah courts have adopted the Restatement's definition of repudiation. In Scott v.
Majors, 980 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals quoted Section 250,
comment b, in defining repudiation: "[T]o constitute repudiation, a party's language must
be sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean that the party will not . . .
perform. . . ." Id. at 218.9 This Court has stated that repudiation "occurs when a party to
an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent not to render
performance when the time fixed for performance is due." Kasco Svcs. Corp. v. Benson,
831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992).
The district court gave the following instruction to the jury regarding Wilson's
repudiation claim: "A party repudiates a contract when that party does or says anything
indicating that it does not intend to perform the contract. Repudiation is not the mere

9

Not only have the Utah courts adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, but the
Utah Legislature has adopted the definition of repudiation set forth there, as well. See
U.C.A § 70A-2a-402 (adopting the "substantially impair the value" of the contract
language in the Restatement).
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breach of the contract, or some of its terms." (R. 1146). The court of appeals noted that
this instruction is consistent with Utah case law. (Ct. App. Op. at 16, ^ 43). The court of
appeals properly reviewed the jury's verdict when it found that this Court's common law
definition of repudiation, and not Burningham's proposed definition, is applicable in a
damages suit among LLC members.
Despite the well-settled definition of repudiation applied by Utah courts, set forth
above, Mr. Bumingham argues that repudiation requires a member to deny the existence
of the LLC. Mr. Burningham claims support for this stringent definition of repudiation in
Gherman v. Colburn. This claim is misplaced. In Gherman, the California Court of
Appeals noted the general rule of partnership law "that there can be but one form of
action between partners—an action for judicial dissolution and accounting . . . ."
Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The court stated that "[t]here is at least one important
exception" to this general rule: "where one partner excludes the other, repudiates the very
existence of the partnership and converts all of the partnership assets, the victim may sue
for damages without seeking judicial dissolution and an accounting." Gherman, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 338. The court goes on to state that "[t]he reason for the exception is obvious:
the guilty partner has breached (i.e., repudiated) the basic agreement which created the
partnership. He denies the very existence of a partnership." Id. at 339. The court
distinguishes this "from a situation in which the guilty party recognizes the existence of a
partnership but breaches some obligation in the performance of the partnership agreement
not amounting to wrongful dissolution in contravention of the agreement." Bumingham
relies on this and other similar statements for his argument that partnership wrongful
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dissolution requires one partner to deny the existence of the partnership in order to permit
the other partner to sue for damages, as opposed to a dissolution and accounting.
Based on this definition, Burningham argues that the trial court erred in failing to
grant his pre-trial dispositive motions on Wilson's legal claims and that the jury was
improperly instructed regarding repudiation. Burningham's argument wholly ignores the
fact that Burningham did in fact deny that there was an agreement between the parties
and argued to the jury that no LLC agreement existed. (R. 2028 at 1614, 1630).
Burningham's argument is also incorrect with respect to his proposed definition of
repudiation, which confuses the holding of the Gherman with its ruling. That is, while
the Gherman court held that the denial of the existence of a partnership constitutes
repudiation, Burningham argues such a denial defines repudiation in the partnership
wrongful dissolution context. A review of the numerous California appellate rulings
cited by the Gherman court as support for its articulation of the exception to the oneaction rule between partners demonstrates that a denial of the existence of a partnership is
not required to apply the exception.10 Not a single case cited by the Gherman court
requires the defendant partner to deny the existence of the partnership agreement in order
for the plaintiff partner to sue for damages. Most of the cases do not even mention the
word "repudiation" at all. The central precept of the cases relied upon in Gherman is

10

See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 338-339 (citing Laughlin v. Haberfelde, 72 Cal.App.2d
(1946); Crosby v. McDermitt, 7Cal. 146 (1857); Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal.App.2d
479 (1956); Prince v. Harting, 177Cal.App.2d 720, 736 (1960); Moropoulos v. C.K &
O.B. Fuller Co., 186 Cal. 679 (1921); Wilson v. Brown, 96 Cal.App. 140 (1929);
Johnstone v. Morris, 210 Cal. 580 (1930); James v. Herbert, 149 Cal.App.2d 741 (1957);
Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal.App.2d 272 (1966)).
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that, by converting partnership assets and excluding the plaintiff partner, the defendant
partner has acted as though no partnership exists, thereby effectively dissolving the
partnership. A verbal declaration that no partnership exists is unnecessary and irrelevant.
It is enough that the defendant partner acts as though no partnership exists, thereby
"manifest[ing] a positive and unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time
fixed for performance is due." Kasco Svcs. Corp., 831 P.2d at 89.
Moreover, the Gherman court's own definition of "repudiation" does not require a
denial of the existence of a partnership in order for a partner to sue for damages. In its
decision, the Gherman court distinguishes "breach" from "repudiation," defining "breach
of contract" as the "failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the
whole or part of a contract" and defining repudiation as "the 'rejection; disclaimer,
renunciation; . . . of a duty or relation." Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing Black's
Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968)). The Gherman court dealt with a case in which the
defendant partner rejected "a relation" by denying the existence of a partnership. The
case before this Court deals with the rejection of "a duty." In both cases, the actions of
the offending party are sufficient to fall under the Gherman court's adopted definition of
"repudiation" and, therefore, constitute partnership wrongful dissolution.
Finally, the Gherman court made clear it was ruling on only one exception to the
partnership one-action rule. The court stated that a situation in which "one partner
excludes the other, repudiates the very existence of the partnership and converts all of the
partnership assets" is "at least one important exception" to the general partnership oneaction rule and allowed "the victim [to] sue for damages without seeking judicial
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dissolution and an accounting." Id. at 338. The court did not disclaim other exceptions,
such as common law repudiation, where one partner indicates that he will not perform his
obligations under or otherwise honor the partnership agreement.

Common law

repudiation is, like the case before this Court, distinguished from a mere breach of
partnership obligations and can occur whether or not the offending partner actually denies
the existence of the agreement. Burningham offers no logical explanation as to why such
common law repudiation cannot constitute partnership wrongful dissolution other than to
say that it is not the repudiation discussed by the Gherman court.
Since the Gherman decision, the California Court of Appeals, which rendered the
Gherman decision, has considered and rejected the definition of repudiation Burningham
advances here. In Radell v. Comora, 259 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895-898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
the California Court of Appeals found that repudiation is the denial of liability under a
partnership agreement and is not limited to denial of the existence of a partnership. The
Radell court, interpreting Gherman, found repudiation when a partner agreed that a
partnership existed but claimed that the partnership agreement was fundamentally
different than the agreement proffered by the plaintiff, and ultimately found by the jury,
to have existed. The court found it "unthinkable" that a defendant could escape liability
simply by "fabricating a false version of a genuine contract simply because he or she had
the presence of mind not to deny the existence of any form of contract." Id. at 897. The
Radell court found that the defendants repudiated the agreement when they "denied a
particular contractual relationship existed and their denial was based on offering a
second, sharply differing version of the same contractual document." Id. at 898.
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Cases in other jurisdictions, including in this State, have similarly rejected
Burningham's reading of Gherman. Gherrnan was cited by the Nevada Supreme Court in
Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1985), in a ruling setting forth the standard for
partnership wrongful dissolution which was ultimately adopted by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Wanlass. In Wanlass, the court of appeals determined that a partner may
bring a suit for damages against a partner who wrongfully dissolves the partnership.11
Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572.

The Wanlass court ruled that no wrongful dissolution

occurred, however, because the partnership had been dissolved by statutory operation
prior to the events alleged to have caused wrongful dissolution. Id.
In Jeaness, the Nevada Supreme Court, in an action between partners, upheld a
trial court's ruling "awarding] Besnilian damages against Jeaness under the breach of
contract claim. The lower court found Jeaness committed a breach of the oral partnership
agreement entered into with Besnilian to purchase and operate the cleaners." Jeaness,
706 P.2d at 145. In its opinion, the court quoted from the Gherman court, stating that
"[w]here a partner wrongfully repudiates the partnership and converts the assets of the
partnership to his own use and benefit, the excluded partner has a choice of alternative
remedies" between enforcing the partnership agreement or suing for damages. Id at 145146 (quoting Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343). In adopting the Jeanness court's analysis
on wrongful dissolution, the Wanlass court cited the same passage from Gherman. See
Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. As in the cases relied upon by the Gherman court, neither
11

The types of damages available to the plaintiff partner in a suit against a partner who
has wrongfully dissolved the partnership, as well as the procedures for determining the
damages, are set forth in Section I, supra, and as Section III.C, infra.
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Jeaness nor Wanlass required that the offending member deny the existence of a
partnership in order for his actions to qualify as "repudiation." In fact, in Jeaness, as in
this case, the parties agreed as to the existence of the partnership. Jeaness, 706 P.2d at
145. For the Jeaness court, conversion and exclusion of the aggrieved partner was
sufficient to constitute repudiation, permitting the partner to elect to recover damages at
trial. Id. (stating that trial court "properly found that Jeaness, by excluding Besnilian from
the operation of the cleaning establishment, had committed a breach of the oral
partnership agreement.").
Bumingham's proposed definition of repudiation contradicts the clear analysis and
holdings of the Wanlass, Jeanness, and Radell courts as well as each of the court rulings
relied upon by the Gherman court. As set forth above, the Gherman court's own
definition of repudiation similarly provides Burningham no support for his argument.
Bumingham's incorrect definition of repudiation simply ignores the common law.
Even if this case were decided in the partnership wrongful dissolution context, the jury's
verdict and the rulings of the district court and court of appeals would stand. The jury
found that Burningham rejected, disclaimed, or renounced his duty to perform pursuant to
the LLC agreement and thus found that he repudiated the agreement.

(R. 1107.)

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the jury found that Burningham "convert[ed]
the assets of the LLC for Bumingham's own benefit and use and to the exclusion of
Wilson." Id. As set forth above, this is sufficient to permit a partner to choose his
remedy between seeking damages in a suit at law or seeking to enforce the partnership
agreement within the context of an accounting. Wilson, here, chose to recover lost
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profits damages. The court of appeals properly reviewed and affirmed the district court's
rulings denying Burningham's pre-trial motions attempting to foreclose Wilson's
remedies at law and Burningham's jury instruction relating to "repudiation."
3.

Based on the proper definition of repudiation, the court of appeals
properly reviewed the district court's ruling and jury's verdict.

The court of appeals properly reviewed the district court's ruling and the jury's
verdict. Burningham has not challenged the jury's finding that he repudiated the LLC
agreement and has not marshaled evidence in an effort to assert that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to reach its conclusions. The district court instructed the jury that a
LLC "member . . . shall not be liable or accountable in damages or otherwise to the
company or to the members for any action taken or failure to act on behalf of the
company unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct."
(R. 1150). This instruction correctly informs the jury regarding the legal standard for
LLC member suits set forth in Utah Code § 48-2c-807(l). Burningham, apparently
recognizing the significance of the standard, argued to the jury that his conduct did not
amount to "willful misconduct." (R. 2028 at 1627-1628). Neither the jury nor the district
court made a specific finding with regard to whether Burningham's actions or omissions
were made on behalf of OLP. A reasonable jury could certainly have determined that
Burningham's actions were on his own behalf, and not on behalf of OLP. In such a case,

40

Wilson would not have to prove that Bumingham's actions constituted gross negligence
or willful misconduct.
In any event, that issue is moot.

First, even if the jury had determined that

Bumingham's actions were made on behalf of OLP, then it properly considered the
evidence and detemiined that these actions or omissions constituted willful misconduct.
Second, Bumingham has not, in his appeal, raised the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that his actions constituted gross negligence
or willful misconduct and the matter is not reviewable. Ultimately, the jury found that
Bumingham repudiated the LLC agreement with Wilson, excluded Wilson from the LLC,
and converted the assets of the LLC to his own use, thereby entitling Wilson to damages.
(Special Verdict Form, Question Nos. 12-13, R. 1107). The court of appeals' review of
the jury's verdict on this point was proper and its decision should be affirmed.
B.

The Court of Appeals Properly Found that the District Court Was Not
Required to Address Capital Accounts of OLP's Members

Bumingham's argument with respect to capital accounts is, in essence, an
argument about damages. Bumingham does not directly appeal the jury's verdict with
respect to damages and does not marshal evidence in an attempt to show that there was
insufficient evidence to support the amount of damages it awarded to Wilson. Instead,
Bumingham argues, in Section LB. of his Brief, that LLC profits may only be allocated

This Court has defined gross negligence as "the failure to observe even slight care; it is
carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences
that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co,,
709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985). "Willful misconduct goes beyond gross negligence in
that a defendant must be aware that his conduct will probably result in injury." Id.
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to members according to their capital accounts through dissolution and accounting. This
argument is an extension of Burningham's argument, addressed in Section I, supra, that a
resolution of disputes between LLC members requires dissolution and an accounting.
The court of appeals correctly reviewed the jury's verdict and the district court's
ruling by finding that "the question of capital contributions to OLP was a factual one,
[and] it was appropriate for the jury to determine the parties' ownership interests in
OLP." (Ct. App. Op. ^f 21).

Burningham argues that the jury was not provided

instructions on capital accounts and, therefore, could not have properly determined the
respective ownership interests in OLP. This argument ignores both the context of the
jury's verdict and the fact that the district court and the parties agreed that the jury would
determine the parties' capital contributions. Furthermore, Burningham has waived his
claim that the district court improperly instructed the jury, raising the issue for the first
time in his Opening Brief before this Court. See Section II, supra.
Within the context of the jury's verdict, a determination of the parties' capital
accounts is not only unnecessary but also impermissible.

The jury found that

Burningham repudiated the LLC agreement with Wilson, converted OLP's assets to his
own use, excluded Wilson from the business and awarded Mr. Wilson $1,214,062.50 as
compensatory damages.13 (R. 1107). Burningham's actions bar him from enforcing the
LLC agreement between the parties, including the provisions of the Act regarding capital
accounts. By repudiating the LLC agreement, Burningham waived his right to enforce

13

Burningham does not suggest that the jury was improperly instructed on the calculation
of damages.
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the LLC agreement. "It is a basic contract principle that 'where one party to a contract
repudiates it or refuses to perform it, the other party is not obligated to perform his [or
her] promise

'" Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting

17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 704 (1991)). Bumingham argues that "the provisions of the
Act provide the operating agreement for the LLC," and that "the Act is the contract."
(Opening Brief of Petitioner at 23). Bumingham has no right or ability to enforce that
contract because he was found by a jury to have repudiated it. Where, as here, a party
repudiates the LLC agreement, converts the LLC assets to his own use and excludes the
remaining LLC member, the repudiating party cannot demonstrate error when the courts
decline to enforce the provisions of the repudiated contract.
By converting the assets of the LLC to his own use and excluding Wilson from the
operation of OLP, Bumingham assumed all responsibility for the profits and losses of
OLP and obviated any need to determine capital accounts. In other words, Bumingham
effectively expelled Wilson from OLP, thereby canceling his capital account and moving
everything, including profits and losses to Bumingham's account. Bumingham became
solely responsible for profits and losses and a determination of capital accounts is
unnecessary. Moreover, a determination of capital accounts in this case would be very
prejudicial to Wilson, given that Bumingham's conversion of OLP's assets and exclusion
of Wilson from the operation of OLP barred Wilson from working on behalf of OLP to
raise profits. Where the victim member is excluded from the LLC business, he should
not be held responsible for the actions of the repudiating member, who becomes solely
responsible for the profits and losses of the business.
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Furthermore, even if a determination of capital accounts could be accomplished,
the jury has already determined the relative ownership interests of the parties and that
determination cannot be disturbed. Burningham submitted evidence to the trial court that
certain asset transfers from his company, IARC, to OLP were capital contributions on his
behalf. (R. 2021 at 500-506, 611-613; 2023 at 954-956; 2028 at 1620-1621). Wilson
submitted evidence that these asset transfers were actually advances to OLP for revenues
due to OLP from IARC or were loans and, therefore, not capital contributions. Prior to
closing arguments, the district court stated, and the parties understood, that the jury
would determine the amounts of capital contributions to OLP by the parties. (R. 2028 at
1330-1331). After the district court settled on language for an instruction on capital
contributions, (R. at 1157) the following discussion between the district court and
Burningham5s counsel, ensued:
[BURNINGHAM5S COUNSEL]: And then we're free to argue that this
really wasn't a loan.
THE COURT:
Oh, absolutely. They're going to decide what it was.
They just have to know that a loan - if they decide it's a loan, it's not a
contribution.
(R. 2026 at 1330). The jury decided the issue and awarded Wilson damages. The jury
has resolved the matter of capital contributions and the jury's verdict cannot be disturbed
by the district court.
Burningham argues that the district court's determination that the jury's verdict is
binding for purposes of post-trial equitable issues is unfair given the court's pre-trial
representations that equitable proceedings would take place. Burningham is charged,
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however, with understanding the law. As set forth in Section II, supra, this Court's
ruling in Rocky Mountain Irrigation binds the district court from making findings in
equitable proceedings that conflict with the findings of the jury. Bumingham has not
shown that, by following this Court's framework for cases presenting overlapping legal
and equitable issues, the district court abused its discretion. See Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Atty., 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding that district court's
conduct of proceedings is reviewed for basic fairness to determine abuse of discretion by
the trial court). Moreover, Bumingham understood that the jury's damages calculation
could not be questioned.
THE COURT:
. . . What we don't do i[s] second guess their damages
on breach of contract which they don't need to make findings on in any
event.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
And I agree with that and the basic concept.
That's how we generally approach questions with the jury.
(R. 2028 at 1511)
Finally, Bumingham's argument that the jury was improperly instructed on the
issue of capital accounts should not be considered because he did not preserve that issue
below. Bumingham did not raise the issue before the court of appeals and should not be
permitted to raise it before this Court.
C.

The Court of Appeals Properly Found that the District Court Did Not
Judicially Dissolve OLP.

Bumingham's argument that the district court dissolved OLP, or was somehow
obligated to do so, ignores the ruling of the district court and misinterprets the law.
Bumingham argues that the trial court dissolved OLP at a hearing which dealt with,
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among other things, Burningham's renewed pretrial motions for summary judgment in
the form of a motion for directed verdict. That is false. The trial court specifically did
not dissolve OLP. Rather, it concluded that it was for the jury to determine whether a
wrongful dissolution had occurred, and that, only if the jury did not so find, it would
proceed under the Act under the assumption that August 31, 2001 would be the
dissolution date if further proceedings were necessary:
For the record, I am determining and I think it's time to do so that a
dissolution occurred—and I already went through the statutory basis and
the facts under 48-2c-1210-2, a dissolution did occur no later than August
31, 2001 and that is the date we'll use. I'm determining that it's a jury
question whether there was a wrongful dissolution chargeable to Mr.
Burningham and that the elements that have to be set forth and addressed in
the verdict form are exclusion, repudiation and conversion of the assets of
the LLC and the determination of damages will be dictated to a large extent
by what the jury determines. If they determine a wrongful dissolution, they
can address full expectation including lost profit clear through trial If they
do not determine wrongful dissolution, lost profits are cut off as of August
31, 2001 and you need to put that in specifically and we reserye the
remaining issues for the Court thereafter.
(R. 2026 at 1282) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court plainly contemplated and
informed counsel that the jury could determine whether wrongful dissolution of OLP, due
to exclusion, repudiation and conversion, was proven, and that the jury would address
full damages for those claims if they so found. Only if the jury did not so find, would
the trial court consider engaging in the possible equitable remedies authorized under the
LLC Act. This does not, and cannot, amount to judicial dissolution of a LLC.
Judicial dissolution occurs only when a district court files a decree of judicial
dissolution pursuant to Utah Code § 48-2c-1213. See Utah Code § 48-2c-1201(6).
Section 48-2c-1213 provides that if the district court determines that there exist grounds
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for judicial dissolution, as set forth in Utah Code § 48-2e-1210, the court may enter a
decree of judicial dissolution, which dissolves the LLC. A limited liability company is
not judicially dissolved unless and until a court enters a decree of judicial dissolution.
The Act provides the district court discretion in its determination as to whether or not to
file a decree of judicial dissolution if it determines that grounds for judicial dissolution
exist. The district court in this case may have determined that the grounds for judicial
dissolution were present, but exercised its discretion not to enter a decree of judicial
dissolution and allowed the jury to determine whether Burningham had repudiated the
LLC agreement.
Moreover, the district court was barred from dissolving OLP and conducting the
LLC Act's equitable winding up and accounting procedures prior to the jury's
determination of Wilson's legal claims. "[W]hen legal and equitable issues turn on the
same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first . . . ." Rocky Mountain
Irrigation, 795 P.2d at 662. Wilson was entitled to the jury's determination of his legal
claims before a determination of Bumingham's parallel equitable claims. As a result, even
if the district court can be deemed to have dissolved OLP, it could not have, in any event,
proceeded to conduct equitable wind up and accounting procedures until the jury had
determined Bumingham's legal claims. As set forth in Sections II and III.B, supra, once the
jury rendered its verdict, the district court was bound by the jury's determinations of the
members' capital accounts.
The district court did not, and indeed could not have, dissolved OLP prior to a trial
on Wilson's legal claims against Burningham.
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D.

The Court of Appeals Properly Upheld the District Court's Resolution of
Burningham's Equitable Defenses.

Burningham has asserted, in Section III.C of his Opening Brief, that the district court
failed to review two of his equitable defenses: estoppel and laches. Burningham has not
preserved this issue for appeal. He did not mention the laches defense in his Opening Brief
before the court of appeals, nor did he argue that he was prejudiced by the district court's
failure to address that defense. As a result, this Court may not review that issue. Moreover,
as the district court found in its April 5, 2005 Ruling and Order, the jury considered
Wilson's equitable defenses and, by rendering a verdict in Wilson's favor, rejected them.
(R. 1585) (stating that the jury "could not have reached their conclusion of breach and
damages unless they considered and rejected all proffered defenses, both legal and
equitable.").
In any event, Burningham is not entitled to relief based on his equitable defenses of
estoppel or laches. With respect to Burningham's estoppel argument, the court of appeals
properly reviewed the district court's adjudication of that matter when it observed that
Burningham suffered no prejudice from the evolving nature of the case. "Estoppel is an
equitable defense that requires proof of three elements:
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement,
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989).
Burningham's estoppel theory, that "Wilson took inconsistent positions on dissolution"
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(Opening Brief of Petitioner at 49), cannot constitute estoppel. Even if Wilson acted
inconsistently with a claim later asserted, which is doubtful, any "action or inaction" by
Bumingham on the basis of Wilson's prior act could not have been "reasonable" and
Bumingham most certainly did not suffer any injury as a result of his reliance any of
Wilson's prior acts. As the court of appeals noted, "it was clear well before trial that Wilson
was asserting a legal claim that Bumingham had wrongfully excluded him from OLP and
converted OLP's assets to his personal use." (Ct. App. Op. at 13). The court went on to
state that "Burningham's good faith belief and argument that this claim was precluded by
the LLC A c t . . . did not excuse him from defending against the claim in the district court."
Id.
Similarly, Burningham's laches theory affords him no relief. To prove laches,
Bumingham must show "(1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to
defendant owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). "Laches is usually not mere
delay, but standing by watching one change his position or delay for such length of time
that it amounts to an acquiescence." Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co., 57
P.2d 1099, 1125 (Utah 1936). "Laches is, or is based on, delay attended by or inducing
change of condition or relation."

Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.). Even if

Bumingham could prove that Wilson lacked diligence, which he cannot, Bumingham
cannot prove that he suffered any resulting injury. There was no change of position,
condition, or relation as a result of Wilson's alleged delay and Bumingham cannot prove
laches and any error related to the court of appeals' review is harmless.
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CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Opinion of the court of
appeals in its entirety.
DATED this 17th day of November, 2008.
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C.

Brent O. Hatch
Phillip J. Russell
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Respondents
Richard Wilson and OLP, LLC
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